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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs • 
RICHARD W. JONES, Case No. 900526-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This Brief is in response to the Brief of Appellee submitted 
to this Court on May 28, 1991. In order to clarify the position of 
the appellant the organization of the State will be retained within 
this Brief. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The State misconstrues the standard of review in this case. 
The defendant is not seeking to "set aside a sentence imposed by 
the trial court" as stated by the appellee. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 
1-2). Rather, Defendant is seeking specific performance of the 
plea agreement which was the ultimate result of the sentencing 
proceeding. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 57 (1971); State v. 
Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The State proclaims that "no constitutional provisions, 
statutes or rules are directly applicable to the resolution of this 
appeal." (Appellee!s Brief, p. 2). This statement simply is 
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incorrect. There can be no question but that Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure must be examined in depth before this 
case can be decided. In addition, the due process and double 
jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution also require that a court which has accepted a plea 
agreement must in fact carry out that agreement except in the most 
extraordinary cases. The specific provisions of statutory and 
constitutional law will be addressed infra in this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State has seriously omitted essential statement of facts 
to a determination of this case. The sequence of events which 
occurred in this case are critical in understanding the argument 
now advanced by the appellant. 
As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief most of the negotiations 
concerning this case had already occurred in the Circuit Court. As 
of April 20, 1990 Defendant and the State had reached a tentative 
agreement that Defendant would plead to one count of the indictment 
and that the remaining charges would be dismissed. At that point 
the prosecutor was requesting that Defendant plea guilty to a 
second degree felony with the provision that the prosecutor would 
recommend counseling in lieu of incarceration. Defendant, on the 
other hand, asserted that he would only plead guilty to a third 
degree felony. See Transcript of April 20, 1990 attached herein 
as Addendum 1. In any event, however, by the time the case reached 
the District Court the only matter left to be resolved between the 
State and the defendant was the degree of the felony and not the 
number of charges to be tried. 
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The uncontested affidavit of the defendant filed in the 
District Court describes this early sequence of events. (R. 
50-53). The defendant specifically wrote a letter on June 12, 1990 
to his attorney Gilbert Athay formally demanding that Mr. Athay 
file a "Motion for Acceptance of a Rule 11(8) (b) Plea." (R. 56-57) 
(A copy of this letter is contained herein as Addendum 2) . In this 
letter the defendant stated that he would not agree to pleading to 
a second degree felony charge unless the court had under Rule 
11(8) (b) formally approved the plea agreement thereby assuring the 
defendant he would not be incarcerated. He specifically told Mr. 
Athay in the letter: 
I once told you that if push came to shove, I would 
eventually accept a second degree plea with the 
prosecutorfs recommendation of no incarceration. 
However, after reading of several cases where people 
ended in prison for one to fifteen year terms after 
making a plea bargain carrying such a prosecutor 
recommendation, I will not accept such an arrangement 
unless it be under Rule 11(8)(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. (R. at 56). 
The next significant event which occurred but which the State 
makes no mention of was the conversation Defendant had with the 
prosecutor on the morning of July 30, 1990. In the uncontradicted 
affidavit of co-counsel Lorin Pace the following summary is made: 
That on the morning of July 30, 1990, the date set 
for entering a plea, Defendant personally spoke to Tom 
Vuyk, the prosecutor in the subject case, who told 
Defendant that he wanted Defendant to plead to a second 
degree felony in order that the State have a larger 
deterrent to assure that Defendant completed counseling 
and did not violate probation. This conversation has 
been confirmed to your affiant by the prosecutor. 
That upon receiving this promise from the 
prosecutor, Defendant agreed that he would enter into a 
plea bargain involving his pleading guilty to one second 
degree felony count, provided that the State make the 
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same promise of disposition for therapy and probation in 
lieu of incarceration, as well as to dismiss all other 
counts and cases and to file no further charges against 
the defendant. (R. 106). 
The defendant believed at this point in time that a bargain 
had indeed been made. Defendant agreed to allow the State to 
obtain a second degree felony conviction in exchange for its 
promise that Defendant would not be incarcerated but would receive 
therapy at an appropriate facility. 
The appellee has stated a portion of the July 30 transcript in 
its Brief. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 2-3). However, this quotation 
is taken out of context and in its correct application actually 
supports the argument now being made by the defendant. Prior to 
the July 30 hearing the defendant was asked to sign a document 
entitled "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and 
Order." Defendant's attorney and the prosecutor had already signed 
this document. (R. 99-104) (contained in the Addendum to this 
Brief as Addendum 3). Paragraph 13 states the following: 
My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The 
promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if 
any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached 
to this Affidavit. See above also. (R. 102-103). 
In fact, there was no "Plea Agreement" in existence at that time 
and the "See above" were handwritten statements which essentially 
was the plea bargain. These statements said: 
(1) State moves to dismiss all other counts and 
charges. 
(2) State will recomend [sic] treatment in a 
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration. 
(3) No new charges will be filed by the State 
regarding cases now known to it. (R. 103). (Emphasis 
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added). 
As will be noted in paragraph 2 above the handwritten plea 
agreement contains a word which is not part of the English language 
namely "recomend". The importance of this misspelling will be seen 
as the scenario of events unfolds. 
On July 30 the lower court asked the defendant if he 
understood that the maximum fine and imprisonment for a second 
degree felony was $10,000 and 15 years. He replied that he 
understood, (Tr. July 30, 1990, p. 6)- The court then stated, 
"Anybody is entitled to make a recommendation, but I'm not bound to 
follow it. Do you understand that?" The defendant replied, "I do." 
(Id. p. 7). This quotation is what the state now relies upon. 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 3). The court then painstakingly went 
through the various elements required in a Rule 11 guity plea and 
the rights that he was giving up. (Id. at 9-12). The lower 
court in sensing that the defendant had some doubts concerning the 
language in the plea agreement then stated the following: 
You may not like the plea you're entering, but 
that's not the criteria. I am sure you would like to 
enter no plea, and leave here today with no charges, but 
that's not going to happen, because the State won't 
agree to it. So you've got a couple of alternatives. 
We can either pursue this plea bargain, and based on 
what I've heard at this point in time, I'm willing to 
approve it, or we can go to trial. And the decision 
really is yours. I want to make sure you have had 
enough time to think about this, because this is a 
serious decision in your life. And if you plead guilty 
here today, you will be a convicted felon, and you'll be 
a conicted felon in a type of crime that is looked upon 
in this, as most communities, as a crime, if we 
categorize crime, as one of the more base ones. Id. 
at 13. (Emphasis added). 
The defendant then stated that he would like more time to go 
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over the paperwork and to make sure that nothing was missing. (Id. 
at 14), He emphasized, "It could be that I'm just paranoid, but, 
Your Honor, I would feel better for some more time." (Id. at 15). 
At the conclusion of the July 30 hearing the defendant had 
declined to sign the "Statement of Defendant." That day he began to 
prepare a supplement to that document. As stated in his 
uncontradicted affidavit: 
7. I drafted a Plea Agreement which stated my 
understanding and intent which was attached to the court 
requested document. It was first presented to counsel 
who modified the agreement, including the types of cases 
which could not be filed against me. The completed 
document reflected my intention and the Statefs promise 
that I be commended for treatment in a residential 
treatment center. The words and forms were accepted by 
the State of Utah. 
8. Said Plea Agreement is attached (a separate 
document), paragraph 2 of which includes the language 
"the State will re-commend Defendant to be treated in a 
program of a residential treatment center in lieu of 
incarceration. 
9. Deponent took the agreement to be one in which 
he would be commended to a probation program for 
treatment in a residential community center. This is 
not happening. (R. 52) . 
The uncontradicted affidavit of Lorin Pace also supports this 
version of events by the defendant. Mr. Pace stated: 
6. That upon further review of the documents, 
Defendant felt strongly that a separate instrument 
entitled "Plea Agreement" be prepared and attached to 
the Defendant's Statement, in order to make clear that 
the State promised that the disposition of the case 
would include probation and therapy in lieu of 
incarceration, as well as the other points mentioned. 
While doing this, Defendant noted that counsel had 
misspelled the word commend by using the form "comend" 
in making brief written notes on the defendant's 
statement. Counsel had spelled the word "recomend" 
which was understood by Defendant to "again commend" 
Defendant to probation as he had been entrusted to 
probation in an expunged 1976 case. To be consistent 
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with this meaning, Defendant properly spelled the word 
"re-commend" which means to "again entrust" and has no 
other connotation to Defendant. (R. 96). 
The "Plea Agreement" referred to in these affidavits (R. 42) 
(contained as an Addendum 4 to this Brief and also to that of 
Appellee) contained the critical language in paragraph 2 which 
stated: 
The State will re-commend Defendant to be treated 
in a program of a residential treatment center in lieu 
of incarceration. That "residential treatment center" 
means Bonneville Community Center, Fremont Community 
Center, or a program mutually agreeable to Defendant and 
the Probation Department. (R. 42). 
On July 31 this Agreement was signed by Mr. Vuyk, the Salt Lake 
Deputy County Attorney, by Mr. Athay and by the Defendant. The 
defendant also signed, at this time, the "Statement of Defendant." 
It should be noted at this point that several statements by 
the appellee are incorrect relating to these events. For example, 
the State has incorrectly cited the quotation of the July 30 
hearing as "September 30, 1990". (Appellee's Brief, p. 3). The 
State has also said "On the following day, July 31, 1990, 
Defendant, his attorney and the prosecuting attorney entered into a 
Plea Agreement." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-4). More correctly, the 
defendant had previously on the day before studied an Agreement and 
the document prepared by the defendant was a clarification of the 
Plea Agreement, which was not signed by Defendant until July 31, 
1991 when he stood before the Court after it had accepted the Plea 
Agreement which guaranteed Defendant should receive probation and 
treatment in lieu of incarceration. 
Finally, the appellee asserts that "the fState' also agreed to 
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're-commend' that Defendant be treated in a program of a 
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration..•" 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 4) (Emphasis added). The appellee has 
misquoted the syntax of the Plea Agreement to conform to the 
language interpretation now argued by the State. The Agreement 
does not state "that Defendant be treated" but instead states 
"Defendant to be treated in a program of a residential treatment 
center." The syntax of the disputed sentence must be examined 
correctly and should not be distorted by the appellee to meet its 
own interpretation. 
Thus, as of July 31, 1990 the defendant, according to his 
undisputed affidavits, believed that in exchange for pleading 
guilty to a second degree felony rather than his sought-after third 
degree felony he would be turned over to a residential treatment 
program and not have to face prison. This would occur, according 
to the defendant, if the lower court approved the Plea Agreement 
entered into by the parties. 
A reading of the July 31 transcript again shows that 
Defendant's belief and interpretation is consistent with what 
actually occurred. 
On Page 4 of the transcript the Court reviewed the newly 
prepared "Plea Agreement" with the defendant. The following 
dialogue occurred between the Court and the defendant: 
THE COURT: Also, the State apparently agrees to 
recommend some type of an in-patient treatment facility 
such as Bonneville or Fremont or something like that. 
MR. JONES: I understand that. 
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THE COURT: Part of the Plea Agreement says, and I'll 
make sure that you understand this now, if it's not one 
of those two, Bonneville or Fremont, then it will be a 
mutually agreeable facility between yourself and Adult 
Probation and Parole, Is that part of your 
understanding? 
* * * 
MR. JONES: Yes. 
THE COURT: I can tell you right now, I don't approve of 
that. I will not allow you to have any input into where 
you're going to go if you're on probation. So you need 
to know that right up front. 
MR. JONES: So you would just take their recommendation? 
THE COURT: Whatever they want. If I put you on 
probation, you go where they say you go. I can tell you 
right now, I won't follow that, even if I decide to put 
you on probation. All right. So if—with those things 
in mind, you understand that the potential maximum 
punishment in this case, if I determine it's 
appropriate, Mr. Jones, is a period of incarceration in 
the Utah State Prison of not less than one, no more than 
fifteen years, and/or a $10,000 fine. Do you understand 
that's a possibility in this case? 
MR. JONES: I understand. (Tr. July 31, 1990, pp. 
4-6). (Emphasis added). 
To the defendant, this dialogue meant that if the lower court 
did not approve the Plea Agreement then the defendant would be 
subject to imprisonment and would have to decide if he wished to 
continue to maintain his guilty plea or to then go to trial. The 
Court then once again went through all of the rights given up in a 
guilty plea as the Court had done on the prior day with the 
exception that he made no mention that the Court was not bound by 
any recommendation made by the prosecutor. (Id. pp. 7-10). 
When the Court ultimately accepted the guilty plea (Id. at 
12-13) the defendant believed that the Court under Rule 11(8)(b) 
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had "approved the proposed disposition." When the Court referred 
the defendant to the Adult Probation and Parole Department he 
believed that the Probation Department would determine an 
appropriate treatment center for him but that in no event would he 
be sent to prison. 
On August 29, 1990 the defendant filed a "Request for 
Clarification of Plea Bargain or Thereafter in the Alternative for 
Leave to Withdraw Plea." It was filed by attorney Lorin Pace. (R. 
48). On September 6, 1990 Gilbert Athay withdrew as Defendant's 
attorney. (R. 58). On September 14, 1990 Jerome Mooney, a newly 
retained attorney, filed a "Memorandum in Support of Request for 
Clarification of Plea Agreement or Withdrawal of Plea." (R. 
59-76). This Memorandum stated, in part: 
In reliance on his understanding and intent of the 
Plea Agreement and upon demand from his probation 
officer that it was required and necessary, Mr. Jones 
disclosed confidential information about his pedophilic 
behavior. He assumed that this information was required 
in order for a "purging" of his conduct to occur, to 
demonstrate his good faith in entering into the plea 
bargain, and for the purpose of protecting the children 
involved in this matter, his family, and society by his 
obtaining treatment for his disorder. After reading the 
Presentence Report issued by the Adult Probation and 
Parol Department, Mr. Jones is now aware that this 
Department will recommend a prison sentence rather than 
the therapy which was the goal of the Plea Agreement. 
The Defendant, Mr. Jones, therefore respectfully 
requests that his Motion for Clarification of Plea 
Agreement be heard prior to his sentencing in this 
matter. (R. 62). 
At a hearing on September 17, 1990 Defendant's new attorney, 
Mr. Mooney, argued that the defendant was seeking specific 
performance of the plea bargain that he had entered into. It was 
at this point that the lower court made the following statement: 
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I have serious questions whether this motion has 
any merit, because I specifically recall that we spent a 
substantial amount of time, Mr, Jones and I, determining 
whether or not he wanted to enter into this plea. And I 
suspect this record will clearly show, that I told Mr, 
Jones that I was not bound by anything the State agreed 
to, I tell every criminal defendant that, and I think 
that will show in the record. If not, you may have 
something. (Tr. September 17, 1990, p. 9). 
As has been noted, however, the record shows that the Court did not 
personally inform the defendant at the time the plea was taken on 
July 31, 1991, that the Court was not bound. 
At the same time Mr. Mooney "renewed his 'Motion to Continue 
the Sentencing1 particularly in light of the fact that I have Dr. 
Victor Cline in the courtroom today." (Id. p. 4). Dr. Cline 
then testified as to a five-week-$20,000 program in Minnesota which 
he believed would be extremely beneficial to the defendant before 
any sentence should be imposed. (Id. at pp. 10-16) . The court 
took both the Motion for Specific Performance of Vacation of the 
Plea and the Motion for Continuance under advisement. (Id. at 
17-18). 
It is again noteworthy that on September 24, 1990 the day 
before sentencing Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw his 
Request for Leave to Vacate his Plea (R. 127) and also filed a 
motin to "Strike Irrelevant Portion of the Presentence Report 
Inconsistent With Plea Agreement." He also filed a memorandum in 
support of the latter motion. (R. 115-25). 
On September 25, 1990 Mr. Mooney argued before the Court that 
the Court had approved the Plea Agreement with the modification 
that the defendant could not approve a treatment facility. In 
light of this approval under Rule 11(8) (b) the Probation Department 
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should have been directed to determine a treatment facility rather 
than recommending prison which was contrary to the Plea Agreement. 
Mr. Mooney acknowledged that Mr. Jones understood in the July 30 
form affidavit that the Court was not bound by the recommendations 
of the prosecution. However, he clearly pointed out that in the 
subsequent July 31 hearing this statement was not made. (Tr. 
September 25, 1990 pp. 17-18). 
The lower court after reviewing the transcripts concluded 
that: 
There is absolutely nothing in this record that 
could lead a person to reasonably believe that I bound 
myself in any fashion to any type of a sentence. There 
is not a Rule 11 conditional plea. There is not one 
word in the transcript, or the Plea Agreement that 
suggests that this is a conditional plea under Rule 11." 
(Id. at 21) . 
The Court denied the Motion for Specific Performance and to 
Strike the Probation Department report. (Id. at 20-24). The 
Court also denied Defendant's Motion to Continue the sentencing to 
allow the defendant to go to the Minnesota program. (Id. at 
29). As noted by the State in its Brief (Appellee's Brief, p. 6) 
the Court determined that since no previous agreement had been 
entered into with the defendant the Court was free to sentence the 
defendant to prison and chose to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF HIS RULE 11(8) (b) PLEA 
AGREEMENT AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON. 
The State in the Argument portion of its Brief has 
misconstrued Defendant's contentions and has somewhat distorted the 
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record as it now exists. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 7-10), These 
contentions will now be examined. 
This case is one of first impression before this Court. 
Unlike most cases, the defendant is not requesting that his guilty 
plea be vacated but is instead specifically requesting performance 
of the Agreement. Both the United States Supreme Court in 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) and the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) recognize that 
plea bargains are matters of contract and that where a defendant 
has taken steps in reliance on a plea bargain agreement that may 
prejudice him in a subsequent trial he is entitled to specific 
performance of that agreement. 717 P.2d at 1306. This Court in 
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989) addressed a 
claim that a plea bargain had been violated when a law enforcement 
agency recommended prison even though the prosecutor recommended 
treatment. This Court, however, has not specifically addressed the 
Rule 11(8)(b) option made available to criminal defendants and 
therefore this case is important to establish guidance to other 
courts, prosecutors and defendants. 
Rule 11(8)(b) states the following: 
When a tentative plea agreement has been reached 
that contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation 
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed the 
judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the 
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the 
plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. 
Moreover, subdivision (c) provides: 
If the judge then decides that final disposition 
-13-
should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, he 
shall advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
Immediately preceding this section of Rule 11 is subparagraph 
(7)(b) which states, "if sentencing recommendations are allowed by 
the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to the sentence is not binding on the court." 
Unfortunately, Rule 11 is not written with great clarity. 
There is no specific procedure outlined as to how paragraph (8) can 
be specifically employed by a defendant to avoid the problems which 
occurred in the instant case. Here, there can be no doubt but that 
the defendant believed that he had entered into an agreement with 
the State whereas he would plead guilty to a second degree felony 
in exchange for a guarantee that he would not be incarcerated. 
Under his belief the written documents submitted to the lower court 
clearly evidenced this proposal and the lower court accepted it 
with the exception of modifying the portion allowing the defendant 
to choose his own rehabilitation center. In the defendant's mind 
the state was no longer "recommending" a course of action to the 
court but instead an agreement had been cut and the lower court had 
approved it. 
The State, on the other hand, argues that the lower court did 
not bind itself as to the action of the prosecutor but instead was 
free to send the defendant to prison or to treatment. Under the 
State's argument at no time did the lower court approve the 
agreement between the State and the defendant under Rule 8(b) 
and (c) but instead proceeded under Rule 7(b) and informed the 
defendant that no recommendations of the prosecutor were binding 
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upon the court. 
The application of these two subdivisions of Rule 8 require 
differing results. If, in fact, a lower court approves a plea 
agreement then the State is clearly bound by its bargain. United 
States v. Holman, 728 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1984); United States 
v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983); State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 
1294 (Utah 1986). At that point, the defendant has the option of 
vacating his plea or requesting specific enforcement of the plea 
agreement. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 
1983); United States v. Mercer, 691 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1982). 
On the other hand, if a binding Rule 11(8) (b) agreement has 
not been made by the lower court but the lower court fails to 
advise the defendant that he is not bound by the recommendations of 
the state then such failure results in the vacation of the guilty 
plea. State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah App. 1989). In 
the instant case, Defendant would be entitled as a matter of law to 
withdrawing his guilty plea had he not been prejudiced by entering 
into the Plea Agreement and by his subsequent conduct in reliance 
upon the Agreement. For purposes of clarifying the arguments of 
the State, therefore, the defendant will address both the vacation 
of the guilty plea and the specific performance of the Plea 
Agreement. 
A. The Lower Court Clearly Failed to 
Meet the Requirements of Rule 11 and 
Therefore Defendant, if He Desired, Could 
Vacate His Guilty Plea. 
Rule 11(7) (b) specifically states that the Court "shall advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
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is not binding on the court." (Emphasis added). The Utah Supreme 
Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that the time for 
such advice must be at the time the plea is taken. As recently 
as July 3, 1991 the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The rule announced in Gibbons was intended to 
ensure that the record demonstrates that the judge who 
takes the plea personally establishes that a defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. To that 
end, Gibbons requires that at the time a guilty plea is 
entered the judge should establish on the record that 
the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights and understood the elements of the crime. State 
v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (July 3, 1991) 
(emphasis added);see also State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 
(Utah App. 1990). 
There can be no doubt in the record that the lower court on 
July 31, 1990, the date the sentence was entered, did not inform 
the defendant that the Court was not bound by any recommendation of 
the prosecutor. The citation to the previous day of July 30, 1990 
by the State is of no avail. (Appellee's Brief, p. 3). Also, the 
State's reliance upon the fact that the lower court advised the 
defendant that he could receive a prison sentence of up to one to 
fifteen years is also of no assistance to it. (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 4, 9). The Court was specifically required by Rule 11(5)(e) to 
inform the defendant as to the minimum and maximum sentence that 
could be imposed as to the offense. This advice was in no way 
related to the other obligation under Rule 7(b) to inform Defendant 
concerning recommendations not being binding on the court. 
Thus, since under Gibbons the Court must strictly comply with 
the requirements of Rule 11 as to those cases in which pleas are 
taken after Gibbons was decided, it is apparent that the lower 
court failed in its obligation to personally inform the defendant 
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on the day of the plea that the "recommendation" of the prosecutor 
was not binding upon the court. See State v. Hoff, supra. 
Defendant could clearly, were there not other factors involved, 
request that his guilty plea be vacated and that he proceed with 
trial. 
B. Because the Defendant Entered Into a 
Valid Plea Agreement Which Was Approved 
By the Court in Accordance with Rule 11(8) (b) 
and (c) the Defendant is Now Entitled to 
Specific Performance of Such Agreement. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the contractual nature 
of a plea bargain. In State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988) 
the court stated: 
To deny defendant relief on the merits, we would 
have to assume that he willingly bargained to plead 
guilty, expecting and receiving nothing in return. This 
assumption is highly speculative and implausible where a 
plea bargain is involved. The nature of plea bargains 
requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the 
parties involved to reach a mutually desirable 
agreement. A plea bargain is a contractual relationship 
in which consideration is passed. See, Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); 2 Wharton's Criminal 
Procedure, §341 (1975). 
In fact, the remedy for a defendant where the state 
fails to fulfill its side of the bargain is frequently 
specific performance. See, 81 C.J.S. Specific 
Performance, §103 (1977); Annot., Supreme Court Views as 
to Plea Bargaining and Its Effects, 50 L.Ed.2d 876 
(1978). A plea bargain does not involve a situation 
where a defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime, 
neither asking or expecting anything in return. Id. at 
893. 
The facts in this case clearly illustrate the above principle. 
In exchange for waiving the preliminary hearing at the circuit 
court level the defendant entered into a preliminary agreement with 
the prosecutor that all charges would be dropped if the defendant 
pled guilty to one charge of sexual abuse. Thus, contrary to the 
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State's assertion (Appellee's Brief, p. 8) the decision to dismiss 
the other five charges had already been agreed upon before the 
defendant even reached the District Court. The sole question 
remaining for determination was whether Defendant would plead 
guilty to a second or to a third degree felony. As noted in the 
recitation of facts, Defendant finally agreed to plead guilty to 
the second degree felony on the theory that the prosecutor wanted a 
"larger club" to hold over Defendant's head should he fail to 
complete his treatment program. Conversely, the defendant believed 
that he was receiving a pre-approved Rule 11(8)(b) plea agreement 
which would commend him to a residential treatment center. 
There is no question but that the prosecutor willingly signed 
the "Plea Agreement" which supplemented the original form 
agreement. Paragraph 2 of that Agreement clearly proclaimed "the 
State will re-commend Defendant to be treated in a program of a 
residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration." There is 
also no question but that the lower court read this agreement and 
modified it by stating that the defendant would not be allowed to 
mutually select his own treatment center. Defendant was therefore 
clearly entitled to believe that the Court had pre-approved as 
required by Rule 11(8)(b) and as Defendant had requested from his 
attorney the Plea Agreement and that it would stand with the 
exception of his selection of a treatment center. 
Before the sentence was imposed of incarceration and after 
Defendant saw that the Agreement as he understood it was not being 
fulfilled by the State he submitted an affidavit of Dr. Thomas 
Huckin who is an acknowledged expert in English language usage at 
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the University of Utah. (R. 109) . Dr. Huckin in his affidavit (a 
copy of which is contained as Addendum 5) stated the following: 
In my judgment, the word "re-commend" is a 
legitimate English word meaning "commend again" as used 
in the sentence, "The State will re-commend Defendant to 
be treated in a program of a residential treatment 
center in lieu of incarceration," the word appears to 
have that meaning (assuming standard formal English 
orthography and syntax). 
It is quite possible that someone reading that 
sentence would think that the writer intended to mean 
"recommend" but the writer claims that he meant "commend 
again" and the spelling of the word ("re-commend") and 
the syntactic structure of the sentence supports his 
claim. 
The plea agreement signed by the prosecutor and approved by 
the lower court was clear and unambiguous. Even if both the 
prosecutor and the court were under the mistaken notion that 
Defendant believed the State was only "recommending" a treatment 
program the plain language of the agreement controls. In United 
States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1988) the 
prosecutor mistakenly signed a plea agreement in which the wrong 
section of the federal code was cited thereby allowing defendant to 
plead guilty to a misdemeanor rather than to a felony. The 
district court allowed the government to rescind the agreement but 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agreement was 
binding upon the government and that the defendant was entitled to 
specific performance. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that if a plea 
bargain is shown to have been contrary to the rights of a 
defendant, there are two options available for the court. First, 
the court, upon the request of the defendant, may withdraw the 
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guilty plea and place the defendant in as near a postion as 
possible prior to the plea agreement having been made. Second, the 
court may order specific performance of the plea agreement 
regardless of the protests of the government. Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
The Supreme Court in Kay, supra, held that while nothing in 
Rule 11 specifically allows a conditional plea to be made, there is 
also nothing which prohibits a conditional plea from being entered. 
In fact, the Court found that the better reasoned cases and policy 
considerations allow a court to disclose a proposed sentence as 
part of the plea bargaining process so long as a judge acts as a 
moderator and not as an advocate. Id. at 1300-01. The court 
stated: 
In fact, subpart (e)(6) of the 1983 Rule 11 
[subsequently renumbered in the 1989 amendment with no 
change in meaning] requires the judge to inform the 
defendant that the judge is not bound by any 
recommendations of the prosecutor as to the sentence, 
yet it implicitly recognizes that the judge must be able 
to exercise broad discretion in sentencing. 
Essentially, subpart (e)(6) assures a prosecutor cannot 
limit the trial judge's authority in sentencing, but it 
does not prohibit the judge from committing himself to 
imposing a particular sentence as a condition of a plea 
agreement. Id. at 1300, fn. 5. (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court bound 
itself with the prosecutor as to the specific disposition of the 
case. By informing the defendant that the court would not allow 
the defendant to pick an alternate residence site, the court 
expressly or impliedly approved the other terms of the Plea 
Agreement. Thus, Defendant entered a conditional plea that he 
would waive his constitutional right to a jury trial in exchange 
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for the State dismissing the other counts and cases against him and 
that he definitely be placed in a probationary treatment program 
and not in prison. 
In Kay, the Utah Supreme Court noted the similarities and 
differences between the State Rule 11 and the Federal Rule 11. 
Contrary to the statements of the appellee (Appellee's Brief, p. 
9) the Utah Court adopted many of the cases interpreting the 
Federal Rule 11 and applied them to the State rule. The court 
noted, for example, that while the State Rule suggests that a trial 
court can withdraw a plea agreement even after a guilty plea has 
been formally accepted and entered on the record (which is directly 
contrary to the Federal Rule), nevertheless "this power, should not 
be taken literally. In appropriate circumstances, due process and 
double jeopardy considerations will prohibit the judges from 
reniging on the agreement." Id. at 1299, fn. 3. 
The Supreme Court in Kay approved the procedure utilized by 
the First Circuit#Court of Appeals in United States v. Cruz, 709 
F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983) in determining whether a guilty plea can 
be set aside or specifically performed. The Cruz case is closely 
analogous to the instant case. In that case the defendant was 
indicted for aiding and abetting and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine. Pursuant to a plea bargain between the 
defendant and the government the U.S. Attorney filed an 
information charging defendant with simple possession of cocaine 
which was a misdemeanor. Also, the government agreed to recommend 
that the defendant be placed on probation. The defendant was 
informed that the prosecutor's recommendation of probation was not 
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binding on the court and that he could receive the maximum sentence 
under the state of a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for not more 
than one year or both. At the conclusion of defendant's 
interrogation the trial court stated: 
After having addressed the defendant personally, 
after having ascertained that he knows what is contained 
in the information filed this morning with the court and 
that he knows his right to a trial by jury and the 
effects of pleading guilty, whereby he is waiving all 
his rights, he knows what the maximum punishment is and 
he is voluntarily pleading guilty, therefore I will 
accept the same and a judgment of guilty would be 
entered as to the one count in the information, I will 
order a presentence report and at the time the same has 
been prepared we would set the case for sentence. 
Id. at 112. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found it was clear that the 
trial court had "unqualifiedly accepted the plea bargain." Under 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a court is given the option 
to accept a plea, reject a plea, or defer acceptance or rejection 
until it has an opportunity to consider the presentence report. On 
December 11, the day of sentencing, the court rejected the plea 
bargain. The court said that in light of the sentences of four and 
eight-year imprisonment given to other defendants justice would not 
be done in defendant's case if probation for one year was the 
sentence. 
The defendant appealed on the basis that the lower court did 
not have the right to vacate the plea bargain and asked for 
specific performance. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
and stated: 
There is no authority for the District Court's 
action in the instant case. Of course, the Court 
initially had discretion to accept or reject the plea 
agreement or defer determination until, with the 
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defendant's permission, it had examined the presentence 
report. But, once the court accepted the agreement, 
thereby binding the defendant and the prosecution, it 
could not simply change its mind on the basis of 
information in the presentence report, at least where 
that information revealed less than fraud on the court. 
Id. at 114-15. (Emphasis added). 
The State contends that the lower court simply "accepted 
Defendant's guilty plea" and did not "specifically or by inference 
accept the Plea Agreement." (Appellee's Brief, p. 10, fn. 4). 
This statement is simply incorrect. On June 30, in urging the 
defendant to take time to examine the documents before entering his 
plea the court specifically stated, "We can either pursue this plea 
bargain, and based on what I've heard at this point in time, I'm 
willing to approve it, or we can go to trial." (Tr. July 30, 
1990, p. 13). This statement made directly to the defendant 
certainly gave the defendant the understanding that the Court was 
examining the agreement and not merely accepting his plea. 
Furthermore, the Court's modification of the choice of 
rehabilitation centers together with the failure of the Court in 
the July 31 hearing to inform the defendant that he was not bound 
by any recommendation of the prosecutor also strongly indicated 
that the Court was accepting the Agreement as written and not 
merely accepting a plea to a charge. 
Finally, it is important to note in this case that the 
defendant raised the objections to the interpretation now urged by 
the State even before he received any sentence. This is not the 
typical "sour grapes" appeal in which the defendant is disappointed 
at the time of sentencing and thereafter concocts a defense as to 
why the sentence should not be imposed. Here, the defendant 
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strenuously objected to the presentence report prepared by the 
Adult Parole and Probation Department recommending prison even 
though, as far as the defendant knew, the Court would honor the 
agreement and send the defendant to a rehabilitation center* While 
Defendant originally sought to withdraw his plea he determined that 
because of the statements he made to the probation department, 
police agencies, witnesses and others in reliance upon the Plea 
Agreement that he could not receive a fair trial and therefore 
specific performance of the Agreement was the only option 
available. See, Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 
1982); Stowers v. State, 363 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. 1977). 
It is therefore submitted that when the entire series of 
factual events are examined, when the language of the various 
documents are examined, when the context of the various court 
hearings and dialogue is examined, that the contention by the State 
in its Brief that Defendant got what he had bargained for is simply 
incorrect. Defendant bargained for a treatment program in exchange 
for a second degree felony plea. Instead, he received a prison 
sentence to which he would never had agreed to on the basis of a 
second degree felony. The defendant is therefore entitled to now 
assert the basis of his bargain and to be allowed into a 
residential treatment center to be selected by the Probation 
Department and approved by the lower court. There is simply no 
other option available to the defendant under the facts of this 
case even though he would clearly be entitled to vacate his guilty 
plea were he not irreparably harmed by his conduct in reliance upon 
the bargain. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is important to the defendant because he has now 
been wrongfully incarcerated. It is also important, however, to 
establish legal standards for Rule 11(8)(b) and for specific 
performance of guilty pleas. 
Defendant is entitled to receive out of prison treatment since 
that is what he negotiated—in exchange the State avoided a costly 
trial and received a second degree felony conviction. The lower 
court was incorrect in concluding that the "Plea Agreement" was not 
a binding agreement which required treatment not prison. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, Defendant is entitled to 
specific performance of his Agreement—immediate release from 
prison and enrollment in a residential treatment program. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 1991. 
Jeirome H. Mooney 
Attorney for Defendant-A^j/ellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam, 
Attorney General and Judith S.H. Atherton, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this 5th day 
of August, 1991. 
-25-
ADDENDUM 
Transcript from Tape Recording Obtained from Susanne Humphries 
Third Circuit Court: Judge Palmer, Friday, April 20, 1990, 9:30 A.M. 
Judge Palmer (JP): Richard Jones? 
D. Gilbert Athay, Defense Attorney (DA): 
A — Gilbert Athay appearing on behalf of Mr. Jones. 
He is present. 
JP: Okay. I understand you've waived reading of the information? 
DA: That's correct your Honor. This matter is on for preliminary 
hearing for next week. This is the matter tht I talked to you 
about --
JP: Yes. 
DA: -- a couple of days ago. 
JP: And you wish to wave that hearing? 
DA: We have reached an - a - a tentative agreement - a - with the 
County attorney's office. We are in the process of finalizing 
negotiations: The County Attorney has offered to permit 
Mr. Jones to plea to one second degree felony - that being a 
Non minimum mandatory prison sentence case. They have agreed 
to recommend counseling in lieu of incarceraton. 
We have offered to plea to one third degree, with the same 
terms applying, and we are going to resolve this case somewhere 
between these two - a - perameters. 
JP: Okay. 
DA: -- And with that understanding, your Honor, Mr Jones --
(inaudiable comments between DA and Defendant) 
With that Understanding, your Honor, Mr. Jones has agreed to 
give up and allay his preliminary hearing - a - on the 
— what do we have — three files — three cases. 
JP: Yes* They are here. Is that correct Mr. Jones? 
Defendant Jones (DJ): 
Well, your Honor, (cleared throiight) 
Included in the Understanding was that all other charges were 
Dismissed and no other charges be filed. 
DA: That will happen. 
JP: Yes. There are four files her*Mr. Athay. 
f^^ • ni/^** 
JP: You understand the rights you give up then by waiving'your 
preliminary hearing Mr. Jones? 
DJ: I Do. 
JP: And that's what you wish to do? 
DJ: Under these Conditions, Yes. 
JP: Alright, let the record show the Defendant has summarily and 
voluntarily waived his preliminary hearing and is Ordered bound 
over for Arraignment in District Court. That is before 
Judge Timothy Hansen on April 30th, Mr. Athay, at .9 A.M. 
DA: Thank you your Honor. May we be excused? 
JP: You May. 
DA & DJ: Thank You. 
EXH3BJT #1 
Addendum 2 
Richard Ul. Jones 
Box 526234 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84152 
Telephone: 467-7262 
June 12, 1990 
D. Gilbert Athay 
72 East 400 South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 94111 
RE: Demand for filing of Motion For Acceptance Of A Rule 11 (S > C b > 
Plea under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and supporting information. 
Dear Gi1, 
I am writina this letter to formally demand that you file a 
Motion For Acceptance Qi A Rule 11(8) (b) Plea with Judge Timothv 
Hansen pertaining to the Criminal actions against me in Third District 
Court. In addition, I shall have a brief in support of this motion 
prepared and filed. 
There are several very compelling reasons for this, but none 
are more relevant than the fact that I am the Defendant and want the 
motion filed. No argument about how Utah Judges over the past 10 
years have not granted such motions, or that you s^r& too busy, have 
any bearing on this matter. 
If the legislature did not see conditions under which a Rule 
11(8) (b) plea is warranted, it would not be provided for bv Statute. 
A good Judge like Timothy Hansen will hear the motion in good faith a^  
part of his judicial duty, and will not be biased bv convention, but 
will rule on the merits of the motion. 
The compelling reasons for the Court to consider are that the 
prosecutor trulv feels that prison would serve no useful purpose in or 
case, and I should take counseling instead. He also would like to see 
a 1 to 15 year deterent to the possibility of probation violation. 
His RECOMMENDATION to this effect is being made in good faith, but thu 
Judge will not necessarily believe that because a plea bargain is 
being made. Though the size of the deterent makes no difference to 
me, because I know that I will never violate probation., the 
possibility that the Judge may not understand the case fully and order 
a prison sentence, makes a Second Degree plea unacceptable unless it 
be with the judges prior approval of the proposed disposition. 
I once told vou that if push came to shove, I would eventually ^cc&pt 
a Second Degree Plea with the prosecutor's recommendation of no 
incarceration. However, after reading of several cases where people 
ended in prison for 1 to 15 year terms after making a plea bargain 
carrying such a prosecutor recommendation, I will not accept such an 
arrangement unless it be under rule 11(8) (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
be-fore the Judge so that he will be able to see that the charges were 
made in excess of what really happened. No general talk about the 
judge already understanding that police put things in police reports 
which ar& not true, and prosecutors -file extra charges as a tactic 
when they know that the charges will not hold up, is going to weigh as 
heavily as the actual -facts. 
The Attorney Fee Agreement which we signed requires that you 
either get the charges dismissed or obtain a plea bargain acceotable 
to me. If you fail to do that, I am entitled to get the $15,000 
consideration back. A Second Degree Felony plea is Not acceptable to 
me unless it were made in abeyance or under Rule 11 with the good 
faith recommendations that the prosecutor has offered. 
Unless ce-tain rumors that I have heard are true, the 
prosecutor will accspt the Motion whole heartedly as the soluticn in 
acheiving the good faith offer that he made to us 4 months ago. In 
any event, he must accept it as a reasonable effort to complete our 
negotlati ons. 
I may confirm other requests which I have made of you with 
future letters, but I believe that this Rule 11 action may make those 
issues mute. 
Thank you for your courage and wisdom. But most of all. thank 
you for helping me file this Rule 11 Motion. It will make all the 
difference. ^^» ^ ^ ^—) 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information) 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and 
elements of the offense(^) for which I am pleading (guilty) (A«-
qon^ eatT*. 
The elements of the criae(^) of which I am charged are as 
follows: U*4ev* C<«~ t_^ «^ i«, J>»*i<• e ^  VoJ- \*n*««A—^ h CAf* <?4 A 
«#• « — — — 
0< jfbcA/t 1^/f/fjLizzie and I went i n t o t h r bedroom ,?nd I tool : my swea t p a n t s 
cnmplf?tn1y of r . «?hn k n e t ' l n d hesidc* ma en tn*: he d as* I l a v e d dewn, 
l i f t e d my «-.hirt J<P a n c < heaan t o p i a v ' w i t h my p e n i s . She Vtest s a v i n g . 
"Now can I open i t ? " <r«s mv p e n i s s t a r t e d t o become e r e c t , but I 
r o f u c ? e H , r a y i n g t h a t i t was n o t hard v e t . F i n a l l y , I was f u l l y .*?rr?ct. 
L i ' i r i p looked a t me and -said a g a i n , "Now ci\n I ? " I s a i d , "Oh, L i r * i e , 
i-f ynu l e t me f i n i s h ,-inri <~hoot sperm on vnu. t h e n you can o p " it*" . — 
Shf =:.aid. "Mow do I Ho i t ? " T a*?4:^ ri h e r t o l a v down and l i f t up her 
t s h i r t . She l i f t e d i t up ' " •po^ inn h e r s e l f froir. \\rr wa*te« a lmos t t c 
h r 7 r r>CyCi •. j k n r a l ^ d by'ni d» h e r and mastwrbatrsd u n t i l ^r*rx s a u i r t s d 
n n t n h r r s tomach . "L; :z i* - ; ! Hold « - t i l l ' \ T ^ a x d . "Vou w i l l not i t • n 
-./our n e t h e r , . J u s t h o - d « , t i i l . I w i l l be r i g h t b«%ck". I went i n t o 
i he bn thronm and m o i s t e n e d a towel on one i ? ide , t h e n r e t u r n e d t o her 
•and c l e a n e d and d r i e d h^r s t o m a c h . My f a n t a c y had been f u l f i l l e d . 
, * 4 .—.4^4*4/ cum wixn 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney, and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require ne to pay an amount, 
as determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for ma. 
jg£- 2. I (have not) (have> waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
i |^3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and ths 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If. I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 
/ and I have had an opportunity 
to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have 
them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify 
or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will 
be drawn against me if I do not testify, 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty11 and the matter will be set for 
trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
3 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, 
those costs would be paid by the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
flagg" offense to which I plead (guilty) (nn-nant^r^). /i know 
that by pleading (guilty) (nn - rnntgurt) to an offense that 
•carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting 
myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense, I know that the sentences may be consecutive and may 
be for a prison term, fine, or both.^ I know that in addition 
to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%) surcharge, required by 
Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed, I also know 
that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution to any 
victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in 
the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) («• 
caRfeeatf I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea (4,) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crime(I) for which my plea(^) is/a*e entered. 
13. My plea(/) of (guilty) (no contest) (is) (is—nofc)» the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit- S e ^ *rWc A *' • 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my 
plea^) of (guilty) (no-c<H*feest) I must do so by filing a 
motion within thir { (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know t*.*.t any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
not binding on the court. 
16. Mo threats, coercion, <Jr unlawful influence of any 
kind have been ma to induce me to plead guilty, ai?d . no 
promises except, those contained herein and in t-ha af^r^ed 
plea iHjrnemc»ntf, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because ail of 
the statements .are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
19. I am H b years of age; I have attended school 
through the & S V£»<yy* grade and I can read and understand the 
English language or an interpreter has been provided to me. I 
was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the decisionwas 
made to enter the plea(4). I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair 
my judgments 
20. I b e l i e v e 
c , L i e v e myself t-« u 
aentaliy capaMe or u n d e r s t a n d ' 0 ' ™ * « " " - c r n i n ,
 B i 
consequences „f my plea and T t h a P « = e e d l n g s a n d ' 
or impairment that „ o u l d " " a" y M n t a l « » " . . . d e r ^ t 
tn teUicent ly and voluntarily e n t e w T "L ' " " W i ^ " 
DATED ttLj^f , f jg^Of**' 
Ml .W~< „ „ ^ M/fT/VlJ ffF" . -. -_ 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
statement or that
 x na"e * ^ ^ ' ^ T r e a T ^ e ' 
discussed it vith him/her '"d . ". to hi»/h« and i
 nav. 
understands the
 Deanin, 'o£ "? b e l " « «»t he/she rully 
Physically competent.
 To toe ^ " f T ^ " ffle»*^ «M 
'«« an appropriate i n J ^ L o n " **»"-»• and
 beli.r 
»»-V) and the ractual synopsis^" 1 1 «*« — - n t . or th. 
»ndu=t are correctly ^ t * °' **" ieC««™'s criminal 
p^resentations and declarations m ^ ^""' al0"9 Vith toe °tt«" 
-ccinc arridavit, are accuttVat I T ^ " ^ *" « . 
A T T O R N
" " " W O M ^ S . 
CERTIFICATE OF PR0SECDTING m o R m 
I certify that i
 aa th 
* case against k ^ J Z V ^ g J ? ^ St"° « «tah i„ 
-^i-^_/ defendant, i have 
6 
r uj r i . jcr r u r r r , " ' T j i r 1 " ^ ! r. T <r-rc< T r-T" r r . j i p j ."trr - . - i 7 • -\{..-rr 
TATE OF UTAH 
"irr 1 i T A L i 
x a i n t 3. 
•'LEA AGREEMENT 
I CHARD W. JCNEE 
9^1900702, ~01-
s at 1 9.Cn3a, .^ hs p ar t : 
-creement: 
:3tc,i)(=nt ct: Defendant uo which 
:orth :wi n 
:• 1 = : 
1. That all other ccunts and cases pendinc apainst the Defendant 
= nai 1 be dismissed, except for count III of case s901900701 wnich 
•hall be reduced to Sexual abuse of a child, which is a second decree 
:elcnv which carries a sentence of 1 to 15 vear imprisonment, and .-'or 
5 10,000 ^ine, ^.nd can be suspended. 
C. The State will re—commend Defendant to be treated in a orocram 
:.f a residential treatment center in lieu of incarceration. rhat 
'residential treatment center" means Bonneville Community Center. 
rremont Communitv Center, or a program mutually aqreeablc? re Defenaan 
;\nd the c rob at ion department. 
That unless authorized in writing bv the defendant, no new 
filed by the State pertainina to cases or information 
ori of a similar nature. 
L^JU&24J±^*^8±I£* 
AFFIDAVIT 
I, Thomas N. Huckin, am an expert in English language usage. I have a 
Ph.D. in Linguistics from the University of Washington and an A.B. in 
English from Princeton. I have taught English as an Assistant Professor at 
the University of Michigan, as an Associate Professor at Carnegie Mellon 
University, and, since last year, as an Associate Professor at the 
University of Utah, where I also direct the University Writing Program. I 
have written four books and more than 25 scholarly papers on the English 
language, and have been cited as an authority in Webster's Dictionary of 
English Usage (1989). 
I have read Exhibit #1, a Plea Agreement between the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, and Richard W. Jones, Defendant, dated July 31,1990, and an 
accompanying affidavit from Attorney Lorin N. Pace dated September 14, 
1990. Further, I have heard from the Defendant his version of the events 
described in the affidavit, which are essentially in agreement with that 
description. 
In my judgment, the word "re-commend" is a legitimate English word 
meaning "commend again." As used in the sentence, "The State will 
re-commend Defendant to be treated in a program of a residential 
treatment center in lieu of incarceration," the word appears to have that 
meaning (assuming standard formal English orthography and syntax). 
It is quite possible that someone reading that sentence would think that 
the writer intended to mean "recommend." But the writer claims that he 
meant "commend again," and the spelling of the word ("re-commend") and 
the syntactic structure of the sentence support his claim. At this point, 
we cannot know for sure what was in the writer's mind at the time he 
wrote the sentence. But his position is clear, consistent, and reasonable 
- as far as I can tell -- and those who signed the document did not 
challenge his usage. Therefore, I think he deserves the benefit of any 
doubt. 
Thomas N. Huckin Date 
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